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Abstract
Software watermarking is a defence technique used to prevent software piracy by embedding a signature, i.e., an identifier
reliably representing the owner, in the code. When an illegal copy is made, the ownership can be claimed by extracting this
identifier. The signature has to be hidden inside the program and it has to be difficult for an attacker to detect, tamper or
remove it. In this paper we show how the ability of the attacker to identify the signature can be modelled in the framework
of abstract interpretation as a completeness property. We view attackers as abstract interpreters that can precisely observe
only the properties for which they are complete. In this setting, hiding a signature in the code corresponds to inserting it in
terms of a semantic property that can be retrieved only by attackers that are complete for it. Indeed, any abstract interpreter
that is not complete for the property specifying the signature cannot detect, tamper or remove it. The goal of this work is to
introduce a formal framework for the modelling, at a semantic level, of software watermarking techniques and their quality
features.
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1 Introduction
Software developers are interested in protecting the intellectual property of their products
against software piracy, namely to prevent the illegal reuse of their code. Software water-
marking is a technique for embedding a signature, i.e., an identifier reliably representing
the owner, in a cover program. This allows software developers to prove their ownership
by extracting their signature from the pirated copies. In the last two decades researchers
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have developed a variety of software watermarking techniques (e.g., [3,4]) that can be clas-
sified in three main categories according to their extraction process: static, dynamic and
abstract watermarking. Static watermarking inserts signatures in the cover program either
as data or code and then extracts them statically, namely without executing the code [4].
Conversely, dynamic watermarking inserts signatures in the program execution state (i.e.,
in its semantics) and the extraction process requires the execution of the program, often
on a special enabling input [4]. Abstract watermarking, introduced in [10], encodes the
signature in such a way that it could be extracted only by a suitable abstract execution of
the program. A watermarking scheme is typically evaluated w.r.t. the following features:
credibility (how strongly it proves authorship), secrecy (how difficult it is to extract the
mark), transparence (how difficult it is to realize that a program is marked), accuracy (ob-
servational equivalence of the marked and original program), resilience to attacks (how
difficult it is to compromise the correct extraction of the signature) and data-rate (amount
of information that can be encoded). The quality of each existing watermarking technique
is specified in terms of their features that are typically claimed to hold w.r.t. the peculiar
embedding and extraction methods. There exists a variety of embedding and extraction al-
gorithms that often work on different objects (control flow graph, variables, registers, etc.)
and this makes it difficult to compare the efficiency of different watermarking systems. It
is therefore difficult to formally prove and compare limits and potentialities of the different
watermarking systems and to decide which one is better to use in a given scenario.
These problems derive also by the fact that, at the state of the art, there is a poor theo-
retical investigation about software watermarking. The concept was formally defined in [1]
and, in the same work, the authors showed that the existence of indistinguishability obfus-
cators implies that software watermarking cannot exist. Furthermore the recent candidate
construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator [12] lowers the hope of building mean-
ingful watermarking scheme. Fortunately this impossibility result relies on the fact that the
signed program computes the same function as the original program. Indeed, in [1] the
authors suggested that if we relax this last constraint, i.e., we require that the watermarking
process has only to preserve an “approximation” of original program’s functionality, then
positive results may be possible. This naturally leads to reason about software watermark-
ing at semantic level, as we do in the present work.
A first attempt to provide a formal definition, in the semantics setting, of a watermarking
system has been proposed in [13]. Here the author introduced the idea that static and
dynamic watermarking are instances of abstract watermarking. Intuitively, the latter can be
seen like static watermarking because the extraction of the signature requires no execution.
But, at the same time, it can be seen like dynamic watermarking because the signature is
hidden in the semantics. So all these three types of techniques could be seen as particular
instances of a common watermarking scheme based on program semantics and abstract
interpretation.
In this work, we start from that intuition and we transform the scheme proposed in [13]
in a formal and consistent definition of what a software watermarking system is. The idea
is to model the embedding of the secret signature s as the encoding of s in a semantic
property M(s) that is then inserted in the semantics of the cover program. In this setting,
the extraction process requires an analysis of the marked code that has to be at least as
precise as M(s). This notion of precision of the extraction corresponds to the notion of
completeness of the analysis in abstract interpretation. This means that in order to extract
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the signature it is necessary to know how it is encoded. In this view the semantic property
for which the analysis has to be complete in order to extract the signature plays the role
of an extraction key. Indeed, the signature is hidden to any observer of the program’s
semantics which is not complete for M(s), namely which does not know the “secret key”.
Based on these ideas we provide a formal semantics-based definition of a watermarking
system. Moreover, we provide a specification of the features of a watermarking system
in the semantic framework in terms of semantic program properties (this problem was not
addressed at all in [13]). For example, it turns out that a watermarking scheme is transparent
w.r.t. an observer when the embedding process preserves the program properties in which
the observer is interested. Moreover, the resilience of a watermarking scheme to collusive
attacks, that attempt to remove the signature by comparing different marked programs, can
be modelled as a property of abstract non-interference among programs.
Finally we do a more precise validation than the one done in [13] (which is just
sketched). We take into account two known watermarking techniques and we define them
in our framework. Our investigation and study in this direction has led to the following
contributions.
• Specification of a formal framework based on program semantics and abstract interpre-
tation for the modelling of software watermarking. The framework refines and extends
the one proposed in [13].
• Formalization of the features (resilience, secrecy, transparence, accuracy) used to mea-
sure the quality of a watermarking system in the framework.
• Validation of the framework on two watermarking techniques.
2 Preliminaries
Mathematical notation
Given two sets S and T , we denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with S \ T the set-
difference between S and T , with S ⊂ T strict inclusion and with S ⊆ T inclusion. Let
S⊥ be set S augmented with the undefined value ⊥, i.e., S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥}. 〈P,≤〉 denotes a
poset P with ordering relation ≤, while a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, least upper
bound (lub) ∨, greatest lower bound (glb) ∧, greatest element (top) >, and least element
(bottom) ⊥ is denoted by 〈P,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉. v denotes the pointwise ordering between
functions. If f : S −→ T and g : T −→ Q then g ◦ f : S −→ Q denotes the composition
of f and g, i.e., g ◦ f = λx.g(f(x)). f : P c−→ Q on posets is (Scott)-continuous when
f preserves lub of countable chains in P . f : C −→ D on complete lattices is additive
[co-additive] when, for any Y ⊆ C, f(∨CY ) = ∨Df(Y ) [f(∧CY ) = ∧Df(Y )]. The right
[left] adjoint of a function f is f+ def= λx.
∨{y | f(y) ≤ x} [f− def= λx.∧{y | x ≤ f(y)}].
Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is based on the idea that the behaviour of a program at different
levels of abstraction is an approximation of its (concrete) semantics [7,8]. The concrete
program semantics is computed on the concrete domain 〈C,≤C〉, while approximation is
encoded by an abstract domain 〈A,≤A〉. In abstract interpretation abstraction is specified
as a Galois connection (GC) (C,α, γ,A), namely as an abstraction map α : C −→ A
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and a concretization map γ : A −→ C that are monotone and that form an adjunction:
∀y ∈ A, x ∈ C : α(x) ≤A y ⇔ x ≤C γ(y) [7,8]. α [resp. γ] is the left[right]-adjoint
of γ [α] and it is additive [co-additive], i.e. it preserves the lub [glb] of all the subsets
of the domain (empty set included). Abstract domains can be equivalently formalized as
upper closure operators on the concrete domain [8]. An upper closure operator, or closure,
on a poset 〈C,≤〉 is an operator ϕ : C −→ C that is monotone, idempotent and extensive
(i.e. ∀c ∈ C : c ≤ ϕ(c)). Closures are uniquely determined by the set of their fixpoints
ϕ(C). The set of all closures on C is denoted by uco(C). The lattice of abstract domains
of C is therefore isomorphic to uco(C) [7,8]. If C is a complete lattice, then 〈uco(C),v
,unionsq,u, λx.>, id〉 is a complete lattice, where id def= λx.x and for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), ρ v η
iff ∀y ∈ C : ρ(y) ≤ η(y) iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C).
Precision of an abstract interpretation is typically defined in terms of completeness.
Depending on where we compare the concrete and the abstract computations we obtain
two different notions of completeness [15]. If we compare the results in the abstract
domain, we obtain what is called backward completeness (B-completeness) while, if we
compare the results in the concrete domain, we obtain the so called forward completeness
(F-completeness). Formally, if f : C −→ C and ρ, η ∈ uco(C), then 〈ρ, η〉 is a pair
of B[F]-complete abstractions for f if ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ η [f ◦ η = ρ ◦ f ◦ η] (equiva-
lently, we say that f is B[F]-complete for 〈ρ, η〉). The least fixpoint (lfp) of an operator
F on a poset 〈P,≤〉, when it exists, is denoted by lfp≤F , or by lfpF when ≤ is clear.
Any continuous operator F : C −→ C on a complete lattice 〈C,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉 admits
a least fixpoint: lfp≤F =
∨
n∈N F
i(⊥), where for any i ∈ N and x ∈ C: F 0(x) = x;
F i+1(x) = F (F i(x)).
Semantics of programs
We consider an imperative programming language IMP, similar to the one described in
[9], equipped with a command inputX that receives an input value from the user. The
input stream given to the program is modelled as a sequence of values. At the beginning
this sequence contains all the input values given, in order, to the program from its first
element to its last. Each statement input “consumes” the first element of the sequence
and so when the sequence is empty there are no more values that can be passed to the
program. The small-step operational semantics of IMP induces a transition system 〈Σ,S〉,
where Σ is the set of possible program states. A program state is a pair 〈C, ζ〉 where C
is the command that has to be executed in the context ζ = 〈ρ, ι〉 that specifies both the
assignment of values to variables ρ and the input stream ι that still needs to be consumed.
As usual, the transition relation S ∈ Σ −→ ℘(Σ) over program states specifies the set of
states that are reachable from a given state. Let us denote with ΣP the set of states of a
program P , and with SP : ΣP −→ ℘(ΣP ) the transition relation over states of P . As usual
Σ+ denotes the set of all possible finite non-empty sequences of states and  the empty
sequence. Given a sequence of states σ = ς0 . . . ςn−1 ∈ Σ+, let |σ| = n ∈ N denote its
length and σi its i-th element. A trace σ ∈ Σ+ is a sequence of states ς0 . . . ςn−1 such that:
∀i ∈ [1, n) . ςi ∈ S(ςi−1).
A state ς is a blocking state, for the program P , when SP (ς) = ∅. Let ΣTP be the
set of blocking states of P . A maximal finite trace of P , is a finite trace of P where
the last state is blocking. The maximal finite traces semantics LP M+ of the program P is
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given by the union of all maximal finite traces of length n > 0 and can be expressed as
the least fixpoint of the transfer function F+ ∈ ℘(Σ+) m−→ ℘(Σ+) defined as: F+ def=
λS .ΣTP ∪ {ςς ′σ | ς ′ ∈ SP (ς) ∧ ς ′σ ∈ S}. We can define the maximal input semantics
function LP M+def= λX.{σ ∈ LP M+ | σ0 ∈ X} that returns the set of maximal traces with
initial state in X . It is possible to compute LP M+(X) as λX.lfp6∅FX+ , where the fixpoint of
function FX+ : ℘(Σ
+)
c−→ ℘(Σ+), defined on the DCPO 〈℘(Σ+),6,unionmulti,∅〉, is the maximal
finite traces semantics starting from X . The partial order 6⊆ ℘(Σ+) × ℘(Σ+) is defined
as: X 6 Y ⇔ (∀σ ∈ X ∃σ′ ∈ Y . σ ∈ pref(σ′))∧((∀σ′ ∈ Y ∃σ ∈ X .σ ∈ pref(σ′))⇒
Y ⊆ X). Here pref : Σ+ −→ ℘(Σ+) is a function that returns the set of prefix of a given
trace, so pref(σ) def= {σ′ ∈ Σ+ ∪ {} | ∃σ′′ ∈ Σ+ . σ = σ′σ′′}. The least upper bound⊎
is defined as:
⊎X def= {σ ∈ ⋃X∈X X | ∀σ′ ∈ ⋃X∈X X .σ ∈ pref(σ′) ⇒ σ = σ′}.
The bottom element is ∅ ∈ ℘(Σ+). Finally FX+ def= λS . {ς ∈ ΣP | ς ∈ X} unionmulti {σς ′ς | ς ∈
SP (ς
′) ∧ σς ′ ∈ S}. We have: lfp6∅FX+ =
⊎
n∈N F
X
+
n
(∅) = {σ ∈ LP M+ | σ0 ∈ X}.
Semantics can be abstracted by computing the least fixpoint of the best correct ap-
proximation (bca) of the corresponding transfer function on the desired abstract domain.
Given the concrete domain 〈℘(Σ+),⊆,∪,∩,Σ+,∅〉, the bca of LP M+ in ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+))
is LP Mρ+ def= lfp⊆∅ρ ◦ F+ ◦ ρ. Let 〈℘(Σ+),6,unionmulti,∅〉 be the concrete domain, the bca of LP M+
in ρ is: LP Mρ+def= λS . lfp6∅ρ ◦ FS+ ◦ ρ.
Abstract non-interference
Abstract non-interference (ANI) [14] is a natural weakening of non-interference by ab-
stract interpretation. In order to model non-interference in code transformations, such as
software watermarking, we consider an higher-order version of ANI (HOANI), where the
objects of observations are programs instead of values. Hence, we have a part of a pro-
gram (semantics) that can change and that is secret, and the environment which remains
the same up to an observable property. Let P be the set of cover programs, Q the set of
secret programs and I : IMP × IMP −→ IMP an integration function. As usual, the at-
tacker is modelled as a couple 〈η, ρ〉, with η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), that represents the input
and output public observation power. In contrast, φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) is the property of the
secret input. We say that the integration I, given η, φ, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), satisfies HOANI
w.r.t. 〈η, φ, ρ〉 and 〈P,Q〉, denoted as H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca, if ∀P1, P2 ∈ P∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q:LP1Mη+ = LP2Mη+ ∧ LQ1Mφ+ = LQ2Mφ+ ⇒ LI(P1, Q1)Mρ+ = LI(P2, Q2)Mρ+. This means that
the integration function permits to the attacker to distinguish nothing more than the prop-
erty φ of the secret programs. As done in [14] for ANI, we provide a characterization of
the most concrete attacker for which a program is safe. Consider η, φ, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+))
and an integration function I, such that H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca does not hold. We define the
higher-order abstract secret kernel as the most concrete ρˆ more abstract than ρ such that
H
+[η]I(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca holds, namely KH+I,η,(φ)
def
= λρ .
d{β | ρ v β ∧ H+[η]I(φ⇒ β)bca}.
3 Semantics-based Software Watermarking
We follow the nomenclature introduced in [10] for describing the basic components of a
watermarking technique for programs written in IMP and signatures s ∈ S.
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Stegomarker M : S −→ IMP, a function that generates a program which is the encoding
of a given signature s ∈ S, i.e., it generates the stegomark M(s) ∈ IMP
Stegoembedder L : IMP× IMP −→ IMP, a function that generates a program which is the
composition of a stegomark and a cover program, the stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) ∈ IMP.
Stegoextractor F : IMP −→ S , a function that extracts the signature from a stegoprogram;
for all s ∈ S it must be s = F(L(P,M(s))).
When L and M are clear from the context we denote the stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) as
Ps. The stegoextractor takes a stegoprogram, analyses it either statically or dynamically or
by abstract interpretation and then it returns the signature encoded in the stegomark. It is
well known [8] that static analysis can be modelled in the context of abstract interpretation,
where a property is extensionally represented as a closure operator representing the abstract
domain of data satisfying it. In particular, static analysis is performed as an abstract execu-
tion of programs, namely as the (fixpoint) semantics computation on the abstract domain.
Instead, dynamic analysis can be modelled as an approximated observation of a potentially
abstract execution since it describes partial knowledge of the execution (only on certain
inputs). This means that, in all cases, the encoded signature can be seen as a property of
the stegomark’s semantics and therefore of the stegoprogram’s semantics. In this view a
stegoextractor is an abstract interpreter that executes the stegoprogram in the abstract do-
main β ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) that allows it to observe the hidden signature. In order to deal with
dynamic watermarking we need to model the enabling input that allows to extract the signa-
ture. Since in our model the residual input stream is part of the program state, the enabling
input can be modelled as a state property η ∈ uco(℘(Σ)). We consider a set P ⊆ IMP of
cover programs and we specify a watermarking system as a tuple 〈L,M, β〉.
Definition 3.1 [Software Watermarking System] Given L : IMP × IMP −→ IMP, M :
S −→ IMP and β ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), the tuple 〈L,M, β〉 is a software watermarking system
for programs in P and signatures in S if M is injective and there exists η ∈ uco(℘(Σ))
such that ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S:
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+= λX .
{LM(s)Mβ+(X) if X ∈ η(℘(Σ))LP Mβ+(X) otherwise
X ∈ η(℘(Σ))⇒ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
This means that when computing the semantics in the abstract domain β, the stegopro-
gram L(P,M(s)) behaves like the stegomark M(s) on the enabling inputs, and like the
cover program P otherwise. Here LM(s)Mβ+ is precisely the information representing the
watermark at semantic level, namely the property of the stegomark where the signature is
hidden. It is clear that, in this setting, it is possible to reduce the precise extraction of the
signature to a completeness problem. To this end we associate the stegomarker M with
its semantic counterpart M : S −→ uco(℘(Σ+)), which encodes a signature in a seman-
tic program property. In particular, given the watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 we define
M
def
= λs.{∅, LM(s)Mβ+,Σ+} 5 . Indeed, M(s) provides a semantic representation of the
signature s. Observe that, by construction, we have that ∀s ∈ S . β v M(s) and this
ensures that β is precise enough for extracting the signature.
5 This is the atomic closure of LM(s)Mβ+.
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Moreover, the abstract semantics computed on β of the stegoprogram reveals the wa-
termark information LM(s)Mβ+ ∈ M(s) under the enabling input X ∈ η only if it is F-
complete for η and M(s). This means that the stegoembedder makes programs in a way
that the stegoextractor has a full comprehension of their semantics and so it is able to extract
the property which represents the signature.
If LPsMβ+ is F-complete then LPsMβ+◦η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+◦η holds. When the input X
belongs to η, we have that LPsMβ+(X) = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) and consequently we have thatLPsMβ+(X) ∈ M(s). This means that LPsMβ+(X) is an element of M(s) and, excluding the
non interesting case where X = ∅ or X = Σ, it is precisely LM(s)Mβ+, so it represents
the signature s. If X does not belong to η, the system should guarantee that the abstrac-
tion of the stegoprogram doesn’t reveal the signature, so we have to chose β in a way that
M(s)(LP Mβ+(X)) = Σ+ minimizes false positive. Note that if the abstract semantics of the
stegoprogram is complete, it may well happen that the concrete semantics of the stegopro-
gram is not complete, i.e., LPsM+ is not F-complete for η and M(s). This means that the
knowledge of the stegomark may not be sufficient in order to extract the signature without
knowing the semantic property used to embed it.
The different kinds of software watermarking techniques can be seen as instances of
Definition 3.1.
• Static and abstract watermarking correspond to a system where η = id and β is decidable
(i.e., implementable with static analysis). This captures the fact that the interpretation of
the stegoprogram always reveals the stegomark, independently from the input.
• Dynamic watermarking corresponds to a system where η 6= id and β is a generic (con-
crete) interpreter. In this case the concrete semantics of the stegoprogram reveals the
stegomark only when a particular input sequence is given.
Now we provide a semantic formalization of the features typically used to measure the
quality of a watermarking system. Of course there are features strictly related to imple-
mentation, like data-rate [5] or credibility, for which we do not provide a characterization.
3.1 Resilience
Resilience concerns the capacity of a software watermarking system to be immune to at-
tacks. There exist four types of attacks [4]: distortive attacks, that change the stegoprogram
in order to compromise the extraction of the stegomark; collusive attacks, that compare
different stegoprograms of the same cover program in order to obtain information on the
stegomark; subtractive attacks, that try to eliminate the stegomark from the stegoprogram;
additive attacks, that add another stegomark into the stegoprogram. Observe that sub-
tractive attacks and collusive attacks are related to the localization of the stegomark and
the resilience to these attacks reduces to problems of secrecy (explained below). In fact,
following [4], we denote as subtractive only the attacks which locate, in some way, the
stegomark. Those which perform a subtractive attack without knowing anything about the
embedded watermark by creating a functionally equivalent program without the signature,
in our work are considered as distortive attacks (they can be seen as distortive attacks which
preserve the denotational semantics). Resilience to additive attacks is very difficult to ob-
tain; in fact, if an attacker adds another signature (with another technique) it is practically
impossible to prove which stegomark was inserted first. For this reason in the following we
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focus on the resilience to distortive attacks.
A distortive attack can be seen as a program transformer t : IMP −→ IMP that mod-
ifies programs preserving their functionality. So there will be program properties that the
attacker preserves and others that it does not preserve. According to [11] we denote with
δt ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) the most concrete property preserved by transformation t on program
semantics, namely such that ∀P ∈ IMP . δt(LP M+) = δt(Lt(P )M+). Observe that when
δt v
d{M(s) | s ∈ S} it means that the attacker preserves the semantic encoding of all
the signatures and therefore the watermarking system is resilient against t. Otherwise, it
could be that t preserves M(s) for only certain signatures, in particular for those which
δt v M(s). So we can characterize which stegoprograms are immune to t and which are
not. In the worst case, when ∀s ∈ S . δt 6v M(s), the software watermarking system is
not able to fend off the attacker t. This leads to the definition of the following levels of
resilience.
Definition 3.2 [t-resilience] A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is:
• t-resilient, when δt v
d{M(s) | s ∈ S}
• t-vulnerable, when ∃s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
• t-ineffective, when ∀s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
Often distortive attacks use code obfuscation for modifying programs while preserving
their functionality, and obfuscating transformations typically preserve the denotational se-
mantics of programs, DenSem ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) 6 . For this reason we say that a watermarking
system is resilient when it is t-resilient to all those distortive attacks t that preserve DenSem,
i.e., when DenSem v d{M(s) | s ∈ S}. A software watermarking system which exhibits
such behaviour has not yet been found and it is an open research topic to demonstrate its
existence or not 7 .
This formalization of resilience allows us to compare two watermarking systems
w.r.t. resilience. Given two software watermarking systems A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and
A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, if it holds that
d{M1(s) | s ∈ S} v d{M2(s) | s ∈ S} then
we have that {t | δt v {M1(s) | s ∈ S}} is contained in {t | δt v {M2(s) | s ∈ S}}.
Therefore A2 is, in general, more resilient than A1.
3.2 Secrecy
Secrecy concerns the difficulty of recovering the stegomark embedded in a stegoprogram.
A watermarking system is secret when it is impossible to extract the signature from a stego-
program without knowing the stegoextractor. In practice, secrecy can be seen as the ability
of the watermarking system to make indistinguishable to the attacker a set of signatures
embedded in a program. This clearly relates to the resilience to collusive attacks, which
requires that an attacker is not able to distinguish between stegoprograms that embed dif-
ferent signatures in the same cover program. This notion can be formalized in terms of
HOANI where the private input is the set of possible stegomarks Q = {M(s) | s ∈ S},
while the public input is the set of cover programs P = P . Let φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) be a
6 This domain can be obtained from maximal finite traces semantics with the abstraction DenSem(X) = {σ ∈ Σ+ | ∃σ′ ∈
X .σ0 = σ′0 ∧ σ|σ|−1 = σ′|σ|−1}.
7 The results in [1] and recently in [12] about impossibility of watermarking seem to lead to a negative answer.
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property that represents some stegomarks, and indeed some signatures. We assume that the
attacker doesn’t have access to cover programs, so the abstraction of the public input is id.
Definition 3.3 [φ-secrecy] A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is φ-secret w.r.t. an
attacker ρ if H+[id]L(φ⇒ ρ)bca holds, i.e., if ∀P ∈ P∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q we have that: LQ1Mφ+ =LQ2Mφ+ ⇒ LL(P,Q1)Mρ+ = LL(P,Q2)Mρ+.
This means that if we mark a cover program with two different signatures that are
equivalent in φ, then the attacker ρ does not distinguish between the two generated ste-
goprograms. Thus, any signature with the same property φ can be used for generating
stegoprograms resilient to collusive attacks from the attacker ρ. We say that a system is
secret when it is >-secret, meaning that the set of indistinguishable signatures is S. Given
a property φ, specifying a set of signatures, we can characterize the most concrete ob-
server ρˆ for which H+[id]L(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca holds, called most powerful φ-secret attacker. It can
be characterized in terms of the secret kernel of higher-order abstract non-interference.
Indeed it corresponds to the most concrete domain ρˆ more abstract than id such that
H
+[id]L(> ⇒ ρˆ)bca holds, i.e., ρˆ = KH+L,id,(φ)(id). For example, the most powerful >-secret
attacker is KH+L,id,(>)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈QLL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+} and
it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms related to the same
cover program. Of course, any attacker with at least the same precision of the extractor β
violates the secrecy property. Thus, the secrecy level of a watermarking system is given by
the most abstract property φ and by the most concrete observer ρˆ for which non-interference
H
+[id]L(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca holds. The more φ is abstract, the more the system is secret. Vice versa,
more ρˆ is concrete and more the system is secret. Observe that φ can range from id (all
the signatures are distinguishable) to > (no signature is distinguishable). When the most
powerful φ-secret attacker ρˆ is equal to > then every attacker is able to distinguish the
signatures. Otherwise, the more ρˆ is concrete, the more secret the system is.
This formalization of secrecy allows us to compare two watermarking systems w.r.t. se-
crecy. Given two watermarking systems A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉 we
consider their most powerful φ-secret attackers ρˆ1 and ρˆ2. If ρˆ1 v ρˆ2 we have that A1
is more secret than A2 w.r.t. φ. Indeed a stronger attacker is necessary in order to violate
φ-secrecy in A1 than in A2.
3.3 Transparence
Transparence concerns the ability to make hard to discover if a generic program is a stego-
program. A watermarking system is invisible w.r.t. an observer if the latter is not able to
distinguish a generic cover program from every stegoprogram generated starting from it.
Definition 3.4 [Transparence] A software watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 is transparent
w.r.t. an attacker ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) if ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . LP Mρ+ = LL(P,M(s))Mρ+.
The greatest is the set of observers for which the system is transparent, the greatest is
the level of transparence. So the characterization of the most concrete observer ρ˜ for which
the system is invisible is a good measure of the transparence of the software watermarking
system. This observer ρ˜ is called most powerful transparent attacker. This attacker can be
characterized with a slightly differentiation of the most powerful >-secret attacker. In fact
a system, in order to be invisible w.r.t. an attacker has clearly to be also >-secret w.r.t. that
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attacker. Clearly the system is not invisible for the extractor β.
Similarly to what we have done for secrecy, given two software watermarking systems
A1 and A2, if ρ˜1 v ρ˜2 we have that A1 is more transparent than A2.
3.4 Accuracy
A watermarking system is accurate if it preserves the functionality of the cover program,
i.e., the cover program and the stegoprogram have to exhibit the same observable be-
haviour. This concept can be defined as “behaviour as experienced by the user” [5]. Pre-
cisely, the stegoprogram can do something that the cover program doesn’t do, but this side-
effects must be not visible to the user. Clearly this definition is very loose and it depends
on what the user is able to observe of program execution. We formalize this by requir-
ing that the stegoprogram and the original program have the same observable denotational
semantics. This means that, fixed what the user wants to (or is able to) observe, the ste-
goprogram and the cover program must exhibit the same input/output behaviour, w.r.t. the
fixed observation level.
Definition 3.5 [Accuracy] Given a poset 〈DO,≤O〉 and an observational abstraction αO :
℘(Σ) −→ DO such that (〈℘(Σ),⊆〉, αO, α+O, 〈DO,≤O〉) is a GC, we have that a water-
marking system 〈L,M, β〉 is accurate, w.r.t. αO, if for each program P ∈ P and for each
signature s ∈ S it holds that αO(LL(P,M(s))MDenSem) = αO(LP MDenSem). 8
So the accuracy says that, for a fixed observational abstraction αO, every cover program P
is αO-observationally equivalent (in the sense of [9]) to any stegoprogram Ps embedding
a generic signature s.
As regarding accuracy, this is a property that is not directly comparable among different
watermarking techniques since it is defined w.r.t. the observational abstraction of interest.
Namely, we can say that a system is accurate and another system is not accurate, w.r.t. an
observational abstraction, but we cannot say that a system is more accurate than another.
However, the proposed formal framework provides the right setting for formally proving
the accuracy of a watermarking system w.r.t. a specific observational property.
4 Model Validation
In order to validate our model we have formalized two known watermarking techniques,
one dynamic and one static, in our framework (the case of abstract watermarking is imme-
diate). Doing so we want emphasise our main claim, i.e., that static and dynamic water-
marking are instances of abstract watermarking.
4.1 Path-based watermarking
One dynamic technique, conceived by Collberg et al.[2], that encodes the signature (a nat-
ural number) in the sequence of choices (true/false) made at conditional statements during
a particular execution of the program. This execution is generated by a particular sequence
8 Here LP MDenSem is the angelic denotational semantics of [6]. Note that LP MDenSem is isomorphic to DenSem(LP M+), so
both formulations indicate the denotational semantics of P .
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of enabling input values. The embedder takes the program code and it adds bogus branches
in order to generate the desired false/true sequence when executed on the enabling input.
Let I0, I1, . . . Ik be the enabling input, i.e., the sequence of input values which “ac-
tivates” the watermark. The embedder takes the program and it adds bogus branches in
a way that the sequence of choices at conditional statements during the execution on the
enabling input is equal to the binary encoding of the signature.
Let Bin : N −→ {0, 1}? be a function that returns the binary encoding of a number and
Branch : Σ+ −→ {0, 1}? be a function that extracts the sequence of choices at conditional
statements in a trace. For example, for a tt guard it can be assigned the value 1 and it can
be assigned the value 0 for a ff guard. Let E : N −→ ℘(Σ+) be the function E def=λk . {σ ∈
Σ+ | |σ| = n+1∧Branch(σ) = Bin(k)∧σn = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉∧top(ι) = } 9 . The semanticsLP Mβ+ has to extract the sequence of choices at conditional statements for the program P ,
so the domain β is β def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | k ∈ N, X = E(k)}∪{∅,Σ+} and it contains all the
sets of traces which have done the same choices, when all the input values are consumed.
With Ws = E(s) we indicate the set of traces for which, when all the input values are
consumed, the sequence of choices at conditional statements codify the signature s.
This is a dynamic technique, so η = ℘(I) ∪ {Σ}, where I represents the set of
states enabling the watermark, i.e., I def= {ς ∈ Σ | ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉 ∧ |ι| = |I| ∧ ∀j ∈
[0, |I|) . top(next(ι)j) = Ij}. Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ =Ws and so M(s) = {∅,Ws,Σ+}. Let
N def= {⊥,N} ∪ N. The domain β can be defined as β def=βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ N
and βγ : N −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def
= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
k ∈ N if ∀σ ∈ X : |σ| = n+ 1, σn = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉,
top(ι) = , Branch(σ) = Bin(k)
N otherwise
βγ
def
= λk .

∅ if k = ⊥
E(k) if k ∈ N
Σ+ otherwise
If X ∈ η(℘(Σ)) then X ⊆ I, therefore the choices at conditional statements made by
L(P,M(s)) starting from states in X are equal to Bin(s), i.e., LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) =Ws.
The same reasoning can be done for M(s), because it codifies the signature by design
(starting from the sets of input states which encode the enabling input) and thereforeLM(s)Mβ+(X) =Ws for every X ∈ η(℘(Σ)).
If X /∈ η(℘(Σ)) then X 6⊆ I and therefore the choices at conditional statements made
by L(P,M(s)) starting from states in X are not equal to Bin(s). So, when the set of
initial states X encodes the enabling input, we have that both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) andLM(s)Mβ+(X) are equal to Ws, which represents the signature s. We can also note that,
as expected, for every signature s, we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete for η and
M(s). The system is not resilient since it is not immune to distortive attacks that preserve
the denotational semantics, i.e., DenSem 6v d{M(s) | s ∈ S}. Indeed the system is
vulnerable to control flow obfuscation techniques (like edge-flipping and opaque predicate
insertion attacks).
9 top(ι) returns the current input value to be passed to the program and next(ι) returns the tail of the input sequence ι.
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4.2 Static graph-based watermarking
One static technique, conceived by Venkatesan et al.[16], that codifies the signature (a
natural number) as a graph which is added to the CFG (Control Flow Graph) of the cover
program while preserving its semantics. In particular, a program whose CFG is equal to the
graph generated starting from the signature is derived and then added to the cover program’s
CFG, in a way that its semantics remains unmodified. The nodes of the added graph are
marked before the embedding, in order to be identifiable at extraction time.
The embedder takes the program and it adds bogus code in a way that the CFG of the
transformed program contains a graph which is the encoding of the signature. The basic
blocks that form this graph are marked, in order to be distinguishable from the basic blocks
of the original program.
Let E : N −→ G be a function that codify a signature in a graph. Let Mark : Σ+ −→ G
be a function that, given a trace σ, outputs the marked subgraph of the CFG of σ for a certain
marking criterion 10 . The semantics LP Mβ+ extracts the marked subgraph of the CFG of P ,
so the extraction domain β is β def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∃g ∈ G . X = {σ ∈ Σ+ | Mark(σ) =
g}} ∪ {∅,Σ+}. In β there are all the sets of traces whose CFG contains the same marked
graph. WithWs def= {σ ∈ Σ+ | E(s) = Mark(σ)} we indicate the set of traces whose CFG
contains the marked graph which codify the signature s. This is a static technique so η = id.
Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ =Ws and so M(s) = {∅,Ws,Σ+}. Let G def= {⊥,G} ∪G. The domain
β can be defined as β def=βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ G and βγ : G −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def
= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
g if ∀σ ∈ X . g = Mark(σ)
G otherwise
βγ
def
= λg .

∅ if g = ⊥
{σ ∈ Σ+ | g = Mark(σ)} if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
The input domain is id so there is not an enabling input, or equivalently, all the inputs reveal
the watermark. Thus, for every possible set of initial states, the CFG of L(P,M(s)) is the
same, i.e., it exists g ∈ G such that ∀σ ∈ LL(P,M(s))M+ we have g = CFG(σ). For how
the technique is designed, into g there is a marked subgraph equal to E(s). So we have thatLL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possible set of initial states. Now, the CFG of M(s)
is exactly E(s) and it is marked by design, so LM(s)Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possible set
of initial states. So, for every set of initial states X , we have that both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X)
and LM(s)Mβ+(X) are equal toWs, which represents the signature s. We can also note that,
as expected, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete for η and M(s).
The system is not resilient, since it is not immune to distortive attacks that preserve the
denotational semantics, i.e., DenSem 6v d{M(s) | s ∈ S}. Indeed the system is vulnerable
to control flow obfuscation techniques (like a CFG flattening attack).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a semantics-based definition of software watermarking and of
its qualifying features that is general enough to allow the specification of the static, abstract
and dynamic watermarking techniques. Indeed, all these techniques can be seen as the
exploitation of a completeness hole for the insertion of the signature in an efficient way.
10Building the CFG and locating its marked nodes are both tasks easily implementable by analysing program traces.
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Only attacks that are complete w.r.t. the semantic encoding of the signature are able to
observe the signature and potentially tamper with it. This means that the abstract domain
used for the semantic encoding of the signature M(s) acts like a secret key that allows to
disclose the signature to attackers that are complete w.r.t. M(s).
Regarding the quality of a watermarking scheme our general framework provides a
formal setting in which to prove the efficiency of a watermarking scheme w.r.t. resilience,
secrecy, transparence and accuracy. To validate our theory we have proved the efficiency
of two known watermarking systems. Thus, we provide a general theory where researchers
can reach a formal evidence of the quality of the watermarking system that they propose.
We believe that this is an important contribution that can be considered as the first step
towards a formal theory for software watermarking where new and existing techniques can
be certified w.r.t. their efficiency.
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